THE PEDALTO INSTITUTION FOR INCORPORATED ART

 
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DIRECTOR   Antonio Pfennig

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Thb decrees of the Court of Chancery have varied in form sit different periods. Much valuable information upon this subject may be derived from the " Calendar of the Proceedings in Chancery, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth," published in the year 1827. That work contains several decrees, a few of which it may be useful to mention. In Reed and Wife v. the Prior of Launceston, p. 114, (Richard the Third's reign) there is a decree of dismission with costs, because the plaintiffs did not appear at the hearing, with a direction that one writ of attachment should issue. And in Broddesworth v. Coke, p. 67, and Slefeld v. Grafton, p. 97, (Edward the Fourth's reign) there are decrees of dismission. In Stokker v. Colyns, p. 97, (Edward the Fourth's reign) there is another decree of dismission, the Chancellor being assisted cum just iciis et aliisde del Domini Regis consilio. In another instance, p. 86, the decree is stated to be made per avisamenlum justicii, servientum ad legem, attornali, et alior. de consilio del Domini Regis, in Cam. Sccrii, vocat. " Le Chekker Chattibre," &c. In Giglis v. Welby, p. 122, (Henry the Seventh's reign) and in Mayhewe v. Gardener, p. 99, (Edward the Fourth's reign) are decrees for payment of money. In Edyall v. Hunston, p. 113, (Richard the Third's reign) an injunction is awarded against proceeding at law, until the matter of the bill was fully determined, or until the further order of the Court; but whether this was done by a decree may, perhaps, be questionable. From the " Calendars" it is to be collected, that when bills were filed, pledges to prosecute, as they are termed at law, or, in other words, sureties to answer the costs, in case the plaintiffs failed, were generally required, and their names endorsed on the bills, probably with a view of giving effect to the provisions of the statute of Richard the Second, which enabled the Chancellor to award " damages according to his discretion" to those who had been drawn into litigation before him upon " untrue suggestions."—